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IU THE SUPP~:.:_s COURT OF THE 
STA'II: OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respo~dent, 
-vs-
ROBERT ALEX VALDEZ, 
Defendant-Appella~t. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
15920 
STATEME!'iT OF TH:C: :'lATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant ~as convicted of the crime of negligent 
homicide by a jury in the Third Judicial District Court, the 
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION I:.J THE LOl\TER COURT 
On February 9, 1978, after preliminary hearing, 
appellant was char·Jed by i~fornation with second degree murder 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953) (R.lO). A 
jury trial was held in the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District on June 12, 1978, and the jury returned a verdict on 
June 14, 1978, of guilty of the lesser included offense of 
negli<Jent homicide (R.70). On June 15, 1978, the appellant 
was sentenced to serve cne year in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the verdict of 
guilty rendered by the jury below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
on December 11, 1977, the appellant shot Melvin 
Gregory Miller to death in Salt Lake County. The facts 
leading up to this event are as follows: 
The daughter of the appellant, Debbie Valez 
(R.l28,129), was not living at home with her parents on 
December 11, 1977. However, on that day, around 4:00 a.m. 
she entered her parents' home, took a set of car keys, a~ 
drove away in her father's car. Debbie then met and pic~ 
up the deceased, Melvin Miller, around 8:00 a.m. that sa~ 
morning (R.l30). 
On the morning of December 11, 19 7 7, th(, appellan 
noticed that his car was missing (R.237). After finding 
that the keys were also missing and realizing that his d~ 
would have barked if a stranger had taken the car, the 
appellant assumed that his daughter had taken the car (R.; 
The appellant arranged to have his brother-in-1~ 
Bill LeFevre, assist him in looking for the car, but befor 
leaving, the appellant armed himself with a gun (R.238,2Y 
which he had purchased while working part-time as a securi 
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gua_ at Wehb Secur~~ '?.229). The =.opellant put ~is 
bul~~~s in the gun ?."39), and left ~J find his 
veh~=~e and his dau~~~~r. The aopella~t was accompan!ed 
by ~~5 brother-in-la~. Ap~ellant stated that he took the 
gun ~~th hi~ as a ms=.~s of scaring his daughter (R.256, 
257,r3). 
At approxir=.~ely 1J:40 a.m., the appellant's vehicle 
was s::otted in the ,_-~=i:-~it"· of North Temple and Third \iest 
(R.:2?). Bill LeFe~=~ ~as ::he first tJ spot the car. 
Whe:-. ~he appellant 5 =.-.,- ::-:is car he coul:: see that it \·:as 
bei~= driven by a b~=-=~ man, ~elvin Miller (R.241), a~d 
tha:: ~twas stopped =-~are:: light (R.~32,133,215). 
LeF~~=e stopped his -:=.rand the appellant got out (?.215). 
The appella:-_ ~ -.-:alked to his car, holding his gun 
in ~-=~h hands (R.l3~ and ::old ~iller to get out (?.242). 
The =.::pellant openec ~::-:e car door and saw his daughter 
lay~:-; down on the ~=-=senger's side of the car (R.242). 
He :::--_~n told ~1iller ::: c;o t'J the back of the car (R. 242). 
11il~~= obeyed the c::-:--a:-:d. The aopellant had his g~:-: on 
Mil ~sr at this time =.:-:: .'!il~er was telling the appellant to 
"Ta>~ it easy with :; 0 _=.:: thi:-:g." (R. 242). The appella~t 
als: Etated that he ~:-=~gh:: ~iller saii, "Take it easy. 
She ::ok the car." =.=so). 
-3-
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The two men walked to the back of the c~r and 
the appellant grabbed Hiller on the shoulder and ordered 
him to "just lean on the car." (R.243). The appellant 
then looked back at his daughter, who was inside the 
appellant's car. At that time, while he was looking at 
Debbie, his gun went off and Miller fell to the ground 
(R.243). The bullet had gone through Miller's head and 
had lodged in his hat band (R.l54,155,188). Debbie 
Valdez then drove away in her father's car (R.l36). 
At the trial, defense counsel requested that 
the court instruct the jury to the effect that the appe~ 
lant was justified in threatening or using force against 
2nother if he reasonably believed that such force was 
necessary to defend himself or third person against such 
others' imminent use of unlawful force and that he was 
justified in using non-deadly force if he reasonably 
believed that such force was necessary to prevent or 
eliminate criminal interference with his personal 
property {R.37). This request was denied on June 14, 
1978, and the appellant cites this denial as error. 
The appellant also cites as plain error Instruct 
17 and 17C (R.55,56,59), which were given to the jury. 
Appellant did not object to their use at trial. 
-4-
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POINT I 
THE T~I~L COURT DID NOT ERR BY DENYING THE 
APP ELI~C; ':? 1 S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION SINCE 
SUCH :r;-;sTRUCT ION liAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
FACTS. 
Respondent does not dispute the basic premise that 
a defendant in a criminal case should be allowed to 
~resent his theory of the case to the jury. This right is 
not absolute, hm·1ever, and has been modified by statute and 
case law. Case law dealing with requested instructions, 
State v. Close, 23 Uta~ 2d 144, 499 P.2d 287 (1972); State 
v. McCarthy, 25 C~ah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890 (1971); State v. 
Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947), indicates that 
a defense theory ~ust be supported by a certain quantum of 
evidence before an instruction will be given. Because the 
right is not unli~ited the trial court is not necessarily 
bound to give all instructions relating to defense theories 
just because the~· are requested or because they are character-
ized by the de:endant as reflecting his theory of the case. 
Therefo~e, if a defendant's theory of the case is 
all theory and no evidence,or so unreasonable based on the 
evidence presented that it does not satisfy the requirements 
of a defense, no instruction thereon is required. 
The ap~ellant requested the following instruction: 
-5-
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The law provides to persons charged with 
criminal homicide absolute defenses to the 
charge of criminal homicide and by_law, 
justifies the death of the person lnvolved. 
If after you have reviewed the evidence in 
this matter and feel that the criteria for 
these defenses exist, the law mandates that 
you must find the defendant not guilty. 
A person is justified in threatening or 
using force against another when and to the 
extent that he reasonably believes that such 
force is necessary to defend himself or third 
person against such others imminent use of 
unlawful force; however, a person is justified 
in using force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury only if 
he reasonably believes that the force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily 
injury to himself or a third person. 
A person is justified in using force, 
other than deadly force, against another when 
and to the extent that he reasonably believes 
that force is necessary to prevent or terminate 
criminal interference with his personal proper0 
,:'C. 37, 38). 
The facts do not support the instruction. The 
second paragraph of the requested instruction indicates 
that force is justified to defend against unlawful force. 
In the instant case, the deceased did not show any signs 
of resistance and did not use force to retain possession 
of the appellant's vehicle. On the appellant's demand, t' 
deceased was cooperative and obeyed the demand by getti~ 
out of the car. At no time did the deceased use any ki~ 
force to retain possession of the vehicle. There was no 
threat of death or serious bodily injury to the appellant 
-6-
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to Lc~evre, therefore, the appellant was not justified in 
using deadly force to obtain his property. 
The third paragraph of the requested instruction 
states, in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-406 (1953), 
that non-deadly force is justified when used to terminate 
criminal interference. This section of the requested 
instruction is inconsistent with the facts of the instant 
case, since the type of force used by appellant was deadly. 
The Utah Supreme Court held, in State v. Nielsen, 544 P.2d 
489 (Ctah 1965), that a gun is a deadly weapon whether it is 
loadec or not. In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-60l(a) 
(Supp. 1975), defines a deadly weapon as: 
Anything that in the manner of its 
use or intended use is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury. 
In the instant case, implementation of a deadly 
weapon constituted the use of deadly force which is not 
sanctioned by the instruction in question or by Utah law. 
The lower court, therefore, correctly refused to 
instr~ct the jury as t~e appellant requested since the 
instruction was an incorrect statement of the law as 
applied to the present case and could have confused or 
misled the jury. 
-7-
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POINT II 
THE APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROH RAISING 
ISSUES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
REGARDING THE USE OF INSTRUCTIONS 17 
AND l7C. 
The appellant contends that the instructions on 
excusable negligence and criminal negligence created a 
disparity in the law in that the jury was not specifican 
instructed on the issue of simple negligence. At trial, 
however, the appellant's counsel failed to object to the 
instructions given to the jury and did not request an 
instruction on the degree of negligence required to convic 
the appellant. Failure to do so precludes the raising of 
these issues on appeal. 
The United States Supreme Court held, in HendNR 
Kibbe, 97 s.ct. 1730, 431 u.s. 407 (1977), that orderly 
procedure requires that views as to how the jury should bc 
instructed be presented to the trial judge and that it wm 
indeed be a rare case in which an improper instruction wot 
justify reversal of a criminal conviction when, in fact, r 
objection has been made at the trial court level. 
United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697 (CA 10, 1' 
also held that objection to an instruction made for the f: 
time on appeal is untimely. 
-8-
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In Stutt' v. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (1976}, this 
Coc:rt held that failure to object to an instruction and 
furnish a proper request precludes any contention of error. 
This Court also stated that the requirement of an objection 
gives an "opportunity for the court to correct or to fill 
in any inadequacy in the instructions so that the jury may 
consider the case on a proper basis. In order to accomplish 
this purpose, the rule should be adhered to." Kazda, at 192. 
In State v. International Amusements, 565 P.2d 1112 
(1977), this Court added this exception: that the rule 
announced in Kazda would not apply if the giving or failure 
to give certain instructions is so "palpable as obviously 
to reflect prejudice amounting to a denial of due process." 
Id. at 1113. 
Respondent submits that Instructions 17 and 17C 
(R.55,56,59), were not prejudicial to the defendant and 
therefore, did not constitute plain error. First, the 
appellant was originally charged with second degree murder; 
the instructions in issue acted in his favor and were not 
prejudicial Lo him since they constituted defenses to the 
original charge. The appellant was given the benefit of an 
opportunity to be excused from any criminal punishment for 
his act (Instruction l7C, R.59}, and the additional benefit 
of having the jury deterfTline if the appellant was guilty of 
-9-
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a lesser offense than that of second degree murder 
(Instruction 17, R.55,56). 
The facts support these two instructions: A 
human being died at the hand of the plaintiff. The 
court, however, realized that loss of life does not 
necessarily call for retribution if the appellant acted 
reasonably. For this reason, the instruction on 
excusable negligence was included. It instructed the 
jury to find the appellant innocent if he acted as a 
reasonable man would under like circumstances. Therefou, 
the instruction was not prejudicial to the appellant. 
The facts also indicate that the death of Melvin 
·hller was not intentional (R. 245). Other facts shov; that 
the. jury could have found that the appellant acted 
negligently in using deadly force in a situation where oo 
force was exerted by the deceased. The nature of the casE 
that is, that a human being died, justified the higher 
standard of negligence required to find the appellant 
guilty of criminal negligence. The jury had to find th~ 
the appellant acted in a manner which constituted a gross 
deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable 
man would have exercised under like circumstances. The 
jury found such a deviation and concluded that the appel1 
had acted unreasonably under the circumstances. Had the 
-10-
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jury not found a gross deviation from such a standard of 
care, appellant may have been acquitted if the elements 
of second degree murder could not have been met. 
Thus, the jury was informed that the law would 
excuse an act which caused the death of another human being 
if the actor had acted reasonably. They were also informed 
as to the result required by law if they found that the 
actor had been unreasonable. The jury was properly informed 
of the law favorable to the appellant. The appellant was 
not unduly prejudiced by these instructions to the extent that 
he was denied due process of law. Therefore, appellant 
is precluded from raising issues regarding the instructions 
for the first time on appeal. Hendersen v. Kibbe, supra; 
State v. Kazda, supra; State v. International Amusement, 
supra; and State v. Pierren, 583 P.2d 69 (Utah 1978). 
CONCLUSION 
A criminal defendant has a right to present his 
theory of the case to the jury under proper circumstances. 
The obligation of the trial court to instruct on that 
theory is guided by the evidence presented, not a defendant's 
churacterization of his theory. The facts of this case do 
not support the appellant's theory that deadly force was 
threatened bul not used since the facts show that Melvin 
MillGr died as a result of the use of deadly force. 
-11-
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The instructions given to the jury on excusable 
negligence and criminal negligence were not prejudicial 
to th~ appellant. In fact, they were favorable to him. 
Th~ appellant therefore cannot contend error as to such 
instructions on appeal due to the fact that his counsel 
failed to object or to request ,tdditional instructions 
at the trial court level. 
Respondent, therefore, submits that appellant's 
contentions are without merit and prays that the Court 
will affirm the verdict of guilty rendered by the jury 
below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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